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Genderand Sexuality
AmyRandall

et u,c;imagine a few social types in Imperial Russia-a married Russian
peasant woman, a gay soldier, and a Muslim urban Uzbek woman-and
how their lives might have been transformed by the Russian Revolution. If in
1912 the young peasant wife Masha had to endure loveless marriage with a
philandering husband because divorce was virtually unattainable, in the new
Soviet Union of the 1920s she could leave her marriage by request. If Masha
became pregnant in Imperial Russia, she had to become a mother unless she
. procured an illegal abortion, whereas in the 1920s she could choose to keep
or terminate a pregnancy. Meanwhile, if in prerevolutionary times, the soldier
Pyotr had reason to fear a potential blackmailer, or arrest and imprisonment,
as he strolled on Nevskii Prospekt in St. Petersburg in search of a same-sex
liaison, in the 1920s Pyotr could cruise gay men in Leningrad without fear of
criminal sodomy charges because of its decriminalization in the new Soviet
Russia. If in Imperial Russia Mirza had been compelled to wear some kind of
veil in public, a tradition among urban and wealthier women in some parts of
Central Asia, in the second half of the 1920s the Communist Party launched
a campaign to end this practice, which she may or may not have supported.
Moreover, if Mirza had been unable to procure higher education before the
Revolution because of traditional gender norms, in the 1920s she could
pursue it as the new Communist regime developed educational opportunities
for women as well as men throughout the new Soviet Union.
At first glance, these social types, and the transformations they experienced,
might suggest a narrative of oppression in Imperial Russia and liberation in the
Soviet Union. This narrative of progress, however, does not do justice to the
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complexity of the Soviet approach to gender and sexuality in the first decade
after the Revolution. Nor does it contextualize how certain "Soviet" ideas and
policies were not sui generis but rather linked to prerevolutionary trends and
changes.Thus, for example, some of the Jadidists (Muslim reformers) in Central
Asia, who called for increased education of girls and women in Imperial Russia,
became Communists who advanced this cause after the 1917 Revolution.
When it comes to changes in Soviet policies and discourses about gender
and sexuality, the transition from the postrevolutionary years of the 1920s
to the Stalin era is often framed by scholars in a similar way as the transition
from Imperial Russia to the Soviet Union, but with the terms reversed: the
changes under Stalin's rule are viewed as a turn to a more coercive and
conservative order. If in 1936 the peasant Masha wanted to pursue divorce or
an abortion, she faced new Soviet family laws restricting divorce and banning
most abortions. Meanwhile, under Stalin's rule in 1934, the soldier Pyotr could
no longer pursue same-sex relations without risk of punishment because of
a new anti-sodomy law. And if Mirza's daughter was in school in Central Asia
in the late 1930s, she might have been forced to learn Russian when the
Communist leadership decreed it a compulsory second language in all nonRussian middle schools.
Scholarship that has argued that the Soviet approach to gender and
sexuality was relatively more radical/progressive and emancipatory in the
1920s, and more reactionary/traditional and instrumental during the Stalin era,
has yielded important insights into the history and politics of the "woman"
question, the Soviet family, Bolshevik feminism, women and wage labor,
gender and empire, sexual minorities, and other related topics. Nonetheless,
as many scholars have noted, this analytic frnmework has obscured some of
the complexities and contradictions, as well as continuities, in early Soviet and
Stalinist discourses and policies.
This chapter explores gender and sexuality during Stalin's rule. It considers
femininities and masculinities, gender identities and relations, sexual norms
and practices, and sexual politics and identities. The Stalinist gender and
sexual order was not unchanging, uniform, consistent, or entirely new; it was
inextricably linked to Soviet discourses and policies about national minorities,
religion, class, and broader historical events as well as gender and sexual
norms and identities in Imperial Russia and early Soviet rule, It consisted of
emancipatory and "radical" as well as repressive and conservative policies. At
its core, the Stalinist gender and sexual order was designed to be in service to
the Party-state, and was oriented toward mobilizing the populace to promote
modernization, grow Soviet power, and advance a new industrial "Soviet"
socialism, 1
When the Bolsheviks established a new Communist government in 1917,
they sought to create not only a new political and economic reality but also
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a new society in which the Russian people as well as national minorities in
the newly constituted USSR would be radically transformed. To do this, the
leadership introduced new laws, institutions, policies and practices. It also
promoted the New Soviet Man and Soviet BecWoman, archetypes whom the
populace was supposed to emulate. When Stalin established control in the
late 1920s and launched his" Revolution from Above;' he continued to pursue
the early Bolshevik goal of widespread transformation, though he modified
some polices, introduced new as well as more restrictive measures, and
expanded the use of repression to achieve change.
Soviet propaganda, literature, and Party-state discourses characterized the
New Soviet Man in the Stalin era, as in the 1920s, as a soldier defending the
motherland from the threat of counterrevolution or war, an industrial worker
laboring on the industrial "front;' and a stalwart member of the Communist
Party dedicated to the construction of a bright new future. In addition to these
archetypes, the New Soviet Man in the Stalin era could also be a collective
farm worker rather than a traditional muzhik, struggling to achieve a modern
new agricultural order; a labor hero who outperformed others; and a master
of technology and nature, such as a Soviet aviator, whose accomplishments
signaled the educational, scientific, and industrial advances of socialism.
In keeping with Stalinist nationality policy, the New Soviet Man was not
necessarily Russian, but if he was from one of the Soviet Union's many
national minorities, he was sometimes portrayed as having overcome cultural
backwardness and benefiting from the tutelage of fellow Russians who were
promoted ih the 1930s as the "first among equals;' as ostensibly the most
revolutionary and "Soviet" ethnicity in the country. The New Soviet Man was
supposed to be secular and reject what Communist leaders considered to be
religious and unenlightened ways. Under Stalin, he was also represented as
a model of culturedness (ku/'turnost,, a man who displayed cultured behavior
and taste. In general, the New Soviet Man demonstrated manly courage
and strength, allegedly made possible by Stalin's leadership and by male
camaraderie, a fraternal band of brothers under Father Stalin's direction. The
New Soviet Man was supposed to be heterosexual, get married, and have
children as well, but relegate his family to secondary priority as he performed
a hegemonic robust masculinity on behalf of the Party-state.
In the Stalin years, as in the 1920s, the ideal New Soviet Woman was a
working mother who produced children for the new socialist order; engaged
in agricultural, industrial, or other wage labor; and took on public duties to
help realize the new society. The New Soviet Woman was also modern and
secular, hence not constrained by traditional peasant, ethnic, or religious
practices. She did not wear lapti (bast sandals) or seek medical advice from
znakharki(traditional wise women), nor did she wear a veil or remain secluded
in the home. In contrast to the 1920s, the Stalinist government promoted
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several additional versions of the New Soviet Woman: the unemployed
wife activist, who engaged in social mothering and civic housekeeping
for the nation; the female collective farm worker who helped to create a
new agricultural system; the female citizen-soldier who participated in
direct combat to defend the Motherland; and the female luminary, whose
achievements were celebrated publicly. In the late Stalin era, the party-state
promoted yet another version of the New Soviet Woman: the unmarried
working mother, whose virtue was officially defined by her reproductive and
productive contributions to the state rather than some "bourgeois" notion
of sexual morality and marital status.

The Family
If there had been some talk about the "withering away of the family" among
Bolshevik radicals during the Revolution and early Soviet years-which
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had earlier suggested would happen under
communism-the new Communist government quickly clarified that this did
not mean the eradication of the family altogether, but the eradication of the
"bourgeois" model of family, in which women were exploited and treated as
the property of men. In 1918, the government promoted the legitimacy of
marriage and the family in the Soviet context by adopting a new Family Code
that made marriage a civil rather than a religious matter, simplified divorce so
that it was affordable and equally attainable by the male or female spouse,
and granted the same legal rights to children produced in registered and
unregistered unions. In 1926, it further undermined religious marriage and
the bourgeois family by affirming the legitimacy of de facto marriages, and
granting cohabitating couples the same rights and duties as those in "official"
marriages. More generally, the Communist regime sought to eliminate not
only bourgeois but also other patriarchal models of marriage and the family,
including those of the "backwards" peasantry and national minorities.
Targeting traditional cultural customs and religious practices, Soviet leaders
established a minimum marriage age to end child marriages, banned bride
price as well as polygyny, and promoted equal inheritance laws. In promoting
these changes, the new Soviet regime claimed to "liberate" women and girls
from traditional patriarchal marital and familial practices so that they could
participate in the building of socialism. The ideal new Soviet family, comprised
of a free and equal union between a man and woman who procreated, would
advance the Party-state's goals. The reality of Soviet families was much
more complex, however, and many women remained in difficult and abusive
marriages because of social norms and the lack of economic opportunities to
strike out on their own.
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Under Stalin, a new Family Code of 1936 made divorce more difficult
and expensive, strengthened men's responsibility for child support, and
banned most abortions. Many scholars have interpreted these changes as
proof of a Stalinist retreat from revolutionary values and a move toward a
more conservative family model. Interestingly, many members of the Soviet
populace-particularly women-expressed approval for the new restrictions
on divorce. Divorce rates had skyrocketed in the 1920s and in the first half of
the 1930s, usually at the behest of men, and women often suffered significant
financial problems when their marriages ended. Although the new divorce
procedures sought to strengthen family stability, after a temporary decline
from 1936 to 1938, the percentage of divorces continued to increase.
If the changes in divorce law entailed a departure from the regime's
earlier revolutionary ideas about free and equal unions by making it harder
for people to leave unhappy marriages, some aspects of the Family Code
did not. The code's focus on fathers' and husbands' financial duties amplified
earlier Soviet family policies to combat male irresponsibility and was approved
of by many women who wanted more stringent measures to ensure men's
payment of child support. Another "radical" aspect of family policy remained
unchanged: de facto marriages and divorces continued to be recognized, with
attendant legal and financial duties for children born of such unions. Stalinist
family policy was intended to bolster family stability and paternal responsibility
so that women would have more children. It did not promote a return to a
traditional prerevolutionary patriarchal model of the family, in which men had
legal dominance and authority, and the family was a private entity separate
from the state. Nor did the new family policy encourage women to return to
the home and abandon wage labor. Stalinist family policy aimed to mobilize a
modern and civic family that would advance Soviet objectives.
The 1936 abortion ban was a retreat from the regime's policy of allowing
women to control their own bodies and lives. For Masha, discussed earlier,
having an unwanted pregnancy or seeking an illegal abortion might have
ended her studies, career advancement, or even her life. The Stalinist volteface in abortion policy, however, was not a radical change in the Soviet
leadership's perception of the procedure, which it had neither condoned nor
considered a woman's right when legalizing it in 1920. Instead, the political
elite had viewed it as a public health necessity-a necessary "evil" given the
high rates of illegal abortions, their harmful effects on women's health, and
the poverty that led many women to seek one. The excuse for recriminalizing
abortion was also couched partly in health terms; the alleged deleterious
effects of the procedure combined with the alleged improvement in people's
material conditions made child rearing easier and abortion unnecessary. In
actuality, recriminalization stemmed from official concern about the falling
Soviet birth rate, particularly among Slavic populations. This is evident from
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a simultaneous secret government decision to limit access to contraception,
even if this was already largely unavailable because of inadequate funding
and supplies. Although the regime hoped to bolster procreation by banning
most abortions, an initial surge in the Soviet birth rate was followed by a
decrease in the late 1930s. Moreover, despite the procedure's new illegality,
there was only a slight and temporary decrease in abortions after 1936. In the
absence of contraception, illegal abortion served as a de facto method of birth
control. As women turned to "back-alley" abortions, which posed greater risks
than legal abortions, there was a sizable increase in abortion-related health
complications, including death.
For many non-Slavic women, such as Kazakh and other Central Asian
women, the abortion ban had little to no effect on their reproductive practices
because the termination of unwanted pregnancies was culturally taboo,
and abortion rates were quite low. The abortion ban was accompanied by
pronatalist measures, however, that did affect the daily lives of at least sorne
Central Asian and other women who had large families. More specifically,
the new Stalinist policy of awarding birth bonuses in the form of annual
state allowances for mothers with seven or more children provided social
prestige and important monetary assistance (albeit limited). Trumpeting
the government's role in easing the burdens of motherhood to legitimize
Cornrnunist rule, the Stalinist regime pointed in particular to how the plight
of female national minorities had improved; birth bonuses, in conjunction with
other new pronatalist measures, such as increased funding for the expansion
of maternity homes, children's nurseries, and kindergartens, underscored the
Soviet break frorn the "backward" past. Purportedly, rural and urban as well
as Slavic and non-Slavic mothers were the happy beneficiaries of the Soviet
commitment to improving the lives of mothers and children.
Soviet pronatalism was not new under Stalin; since.the early days of the
Revolution, Communist leaders, including even radical Bolshevik feminists
such as Aleksandra Kollontai (1872-1952), had praised motherhood as
woman's natural and civic obligation, and adopted various measures to
protect and encourage it.' Stalinist birth bonuses for mothers of large
families, however, were novel. During the SecondWorldWar, the government
sought to further incentivize motherhood by reducing the number of children
necessary to receive birth bonuses. It established a tax on bachelors,
childless adults, and couples with fewer than three children, underscoring
to men and women the patriotic duty to procreate. Communist authorities
also introduced new maternity awards to further glorify motherhood. Such
pronatalist policies were not uniquely Soviet. In the interwar era, many
European governments viewed reproduction as a state matter and adopted
similar measures to increase populations, while also restricting access to
birth control and abortion.
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In the ideal Stalinist family, gender roles were fixed. Women assumed
primary responsibility for the household and child rearing, even when working
full time. Meanwhile, Soviet leaders expected men to marry, procreate, and
provide financial assistance to their families, but not to engage actively in
domestic chores and children's upbringing, expectations mirrored in daily life.
By affording women equal legal rights and greater economic autonomy as well
as establishing a "state-mother-child-triad;' early Soviet policies undermined
the institution of fatherhood, diminished men's family authority, and fostered
gender asymmetry in parenting. During the Stalin era, in actuality, some
fathers were actively involved in family affairs, and many men retained a
dominant family position. Still, Stalinist policies in the 1930s reinforced fathers'
discursive and legal marginality by removing them from their families via
forced collectivization and dekulakization, the drive for rapid industrialization,
and the purges. The Second World War ruptured men's connection to their
families even more, as many fathers marched off to war from which most
never returned.

Work
In the early Soviet years, Communist leaders promoted a social contract
with women that encouraged them to pursue full-time employment and
motherhood, supported by maternity leave, state-sponsored childcare, and
other resources and benefits, but it was only in the Stalin era that the Partystate ideal of the Soviet working mother became a significant reality.The mass
influx of women into the wage economy began in 1929. As families struggled
in the face of declining real wages and living conditions, rnany households
that had previously functioned with one wage-earner needed two to make
ends meet, and more women turned to paid labor. This organic process was
harnessed by the Stalinist regime. Faced with the ambitious goals of the First
Five-YearPlan and enormous male labor shortages, it launched a campaign to
recruit women, and between 1929 and 1941, over 10 million women joined
the industrial labor force and service sector. Although female employment
varied by region and nationality, by 1939, women made up 39 percent of the
paid workforce. A 1942 labor conscription decree and wartime propaganda
contributed to a significant wartime increase of women workers. By 1950,
women constituted half of the workers in the national economy (excluding
agriculture).
Instead of integrating women from the outset as equals alongside men
in all sectors of the economy, Soviet authorities pursued a policy of labor
inclusion through segregation. They encouraged new women workers to
pursue jobs in traditionally "female" sectors of the economy. In addition, the
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regime regendered the economy and labor force by reassigning positions that
had previously been designated as male as primarily or exclusively female.
Soviet policies opened up employment opportunities for women, affording
them new skills and training as well as greater entry into rapidly expanding
sectors of heavy industry, such as mining and metallurgy. Nonetheless,
because of hostility against women workers, central directives to promote
female skilled labor were often undermined at the local level. As Zueva, a
railroad worker during the 1930s, explained: "Men see the woman worker
as an enemy, a wrecker of production, not a comrade:·, When women filled
jobs formerly held by men, they mostly worked as unskilled and semiskilled
laborers, and rarely held managerial and other leadership positions. Ultimately,
the regime's policies reinforced a gendered division of labor, which meant
that "women's work"-even
in previously "male" sectors-tended to be
less prestigious and lower-paying than "men's work." Meanwhile, labor
laws to protect working women's reproductive capacity, such as exempting
nursing mothers from night shifts and providing them with breastfeeding
breaks, were often not enforced. The gap between Party-state policies about
women workers and actual workplace practices persisted in the postwar
period. Nonetheless, despite discrimination, harassment, and limitations on
professional advancement, Soviet women took pride in their work. As Tania, a
construction engineer, noted, "Work was my life. At first I worked in order to
live, later it was more, it went deeper inside and as a result it turns out that
I cannot imagine myself without work:'•
Just as wage labor was gendered, so too was unpaid labor in the home. In
the early Soviet years, Bolshevik leaderVladimir Lenin denounced the drudgery
of housework, Party-state leaders called for the increased socialization of
housework and childcare, and propaganda heralded women's liberation from
"kitchen slavery." Innovations such as maternity leave, communal childcare,
public kitchens, and laundries were intended to allow women to enter and
remain in the paid workforce with fewer biological or domestic constraints.
During the New Economic Policy (NEP) era of the 1920s, however, state
expenditures for such resources dropped significantly, and many factories
and other workplaces allowed existing services and facilities to atrophy. It
was only during the Stalinist drive for rapid industrialization and modernization
that a substantial network of nurseries, kindergartens, public canteens, and
laundries began to develop. From 1928 to 1936 the number of children in
childcare centers increased tenfold. The number of communal dining halls
also multiplied significantly, serving approximately 25.5 million citizens by
1933. Given the overall number of women entering wage labor, and an overall
population of approximately 165 million in the mid-1930s, even such significant
increases in resources were entirely insufficient to meet demand. Meanwhile,
in the new socialist society, an assumption of "natural" sexual differences
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between men and women remained. As domestic work and childrearing
continued to be associated with women, working mothers struggled to fulfill
their dual roles as mother/homemaker and laborer.
In its initial years, Stalin's policy of forced agricultural collectivization
devastated peasant men and women alike, and millions lost their lives in the
resulting famine of 1932 and 1933. Collectivization was intended to be an
efficient and modern agricultural system for fueling rapid industrialization and
extending Soviet power into rural communities. In Central Asian regions with
nomadic national minorities, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, andTurkmenistan,
it was also an instrument to compel people to settle down and become
"Soviet:' Dekulakization, the forced removal of "kulaks" (wealthy peasants)
supposedly opposed to collectivization, led to the summary execution of tens
of thousands and the exile and deportation of millions from their villages.5
Stalinist propaganda, nonetheless, touted the importance and successes of
collective farming. Frequently, it featured a young woman as the public face
of the new agricultural landscape, who represented the transformation of the
"backwards" baba into a kolkhoznitsa (female collective farmer), capable of
mastering new ideas, processes, and technologies. Visual culture frequently
depicted this new ko/khoznitsa as a tractor driver, underscoring women's new
opportunities and the benefits of agricultural mechanization. To some extent
the discursive centrality of the image of the kolkhoznitsa reflected reality; as
millions of men departed the countryside because of dekulakization or the
search for industrial jobs, women played an increasingly important role in
agriculture. But even so, men occupied the vast majority of leadership posts
because of discrimination and a gendered division of rural labor, despite
repeated instructions from the central government to promote women.
Moreover, many men ignored or undermined the few women in higher
positions, sometimes violently.
The official celebration of the kolkhoznitsa stood in stark contrast to the
reality of hundreds if not thousands of bab'i bunty (women's riots) against
collectivization in its early years.' Frequently at the forefront of peasant
resistance, women in Slavic and Central Asian regions blocked efforts at grain
requisitioning and dekulakization, repossessed" socialized" seed and livestock,
and verbally and physically abused Soviet officials and activists promoting the
new agricultural policies. Interestingly, peasant men often stood back from
the angry women, and joined in protests only when they could justify their
actions as masculine rather than anti-Soviet-for example, that they were
safeguarding female relatives. Because Party-state authorities did not usually
utilize force against these unruly peasant women, and rarely punished them
compared to their male counterparts, women's riots allowed for the relatively
safe expression of peasant resistance to Soviet policies. Communist and rural
leaders tended to characterize women's opposition as a product of irrational
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female behavior and kulak manipulation as a way to diminish its significance.
The rebellious women, however, often articulated specific goals and rational
socioeconomic interests as they obstructed Soviet collectivization.
If the kolkhoznitsa served as the public face of collectivization, the male
industrial labor hero served as the public face of Stalin's drive for rapid
industrialization.' Although the male worker had been central to Soviet imagery
in the 1920s, the Stalinist regime promoted the labor hero as another version
of the New Soviet Man in the 1930s. Whether a "shock worker" engaged in
socialist competition, or a "Stakhanovite;' this was a brawny heroic worker who
went above and beyond to achieve greater productivity. The term Stakhanovite
came from Alexei Stakhanov, a Donbas miner who allegedly hewed 102 tons of
coals instead of the 6.5 norm in one shift in 1935. Industrial leaders applauded
and rewarded Stakhanov for his "individual" feat, even though he had auxiliary
assistance, and encouraged others to emulate his purported strength,
will power, and novel work techniques to surpass production quotas. As
Stakhanovism spread beyond heavy industry to other sectors, various markers
of success demarcated Stakhanovites from ordinary workers. Many female
salesclerks, for example, achieved Stakhanovite status by promoting cultured
trade and excellent customer service. The message behind the labor hero
movement was that, despite limitations, such as inhospitable work and living
conditions, an ordinary individual worker-male or female-could become an
exemplary one, even a Soviet celebrity. Indeed, part of the appeal of becoming
a Stakhanovite was that it conferred a variety of rewards, including some that
marked recipients as members of an emergent new Soviet elite.
Tens of thousands of wife-activists provided free labor during the
Stalinist drive for industrialization and modernization. The wife-activist
(obshchestvennitsa) movement first emerged among elite housewives of
industrial managers and engineers in the mid-1930s, and then encompassed
wives of more rank-and-file workers, including those in the countryside. While
some scholars have argued that this movement cast unemployed wives as the
helpmates of husbands, reaffirming traditional gender roles, the movement
also afforded wives more complex social roles as they moved beyond their
husbands to assist society as a whole by promoting education, mannered
behavior, and cultured taste among workers and their families, improving
work and living conditions, and engaging in voluntary labor at workplaces.
By encouraging wife activists to use their allegedly feminine traits, maternal
nature, and domestic experience to contribute to the Soviet project, the
Stalinist regime valorized them and the domestic, in sharp contrast to the
Party-state's denigration of homemakers as ignorant and counterrevolutionary
and the domestic sphere as feminine and unproductive in the 1920s.The wifeactivist became another version of the New Soviet Woman, a new model of
Soviet womanhood.
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Politicsand the PublicSphere
Women's involvement in paid labor as well as in politics and social and
community initiatives demonstrates how the public sphere was regendered
under Stalin. Soviet visual culture reflected this change. In the 1920s, women
had been marginalized in political iconography of the new socialist order and
rarely depicted unless the target audience was female. Moreover, when
represented, women were usually cast in supporting roles to men, as happy
recipients of the new regime's revolutionary policies, or as unenlightened,
or petty bourgeois, and, therefore, potentially counterrevolutionary. Under
Stalin's rule, there was a significant expansion of, and far more, positive
female images. In a wide variety of print and artistic representations as well
as social and political events, women were characterized as active citizens and
positive symbols of the new Soviet order. This was no small matter. During
the 1920s, for example, over 300 Soviet postage stamps-official items of
the new state-had featured people, but they have been without exception
. men; in contrast, after 1929 under Stalin, women began to appear, signaling
their inclusion in the body politic. Stalinist narratives of women as exemplary
figures underscored their modern transformation as well as the successes
of the Revolution and the new Stalinist order; women had gone from being
poor and benighted peasants and workers to successful laborers, and even
unemployed housewives had become contributors to the Soviet project.
Depictions of newly visible women notables, along with images of women
as scientists, masters of technology, and physically fit and strong athletes,
coexisted with more conventional displays of mothers, underscoring women's
ability to be working mothers, including heroic ones. In narratives about female
luminaries from national minorities, becoming a public heroine also involved
breaking with traditional and "backward" religious and ethnic practices.
Despite women's public recognition under Stalin as invaluable participants
in the construction of a new order, and Communist ideology that posited
women's active involvement in politics as integral to their overall emancipation
and the building of socialism, the political elite did not treat women as political
equals. In the 1920s, women's political marginalization had been explained
in part as a result of women's alleged ignorance and lack of economic
independence, both of which supposedly hindered their ability to act as
autonomous political agents. Wage labor was supposed to allow women
to become more economically and thus politically independent from men,
and education was supposed to transform women into politically aware and
active citizens. But despite women's increased education and mass entry into
paid labor in the 1930s, they remained largely outside of high politics under
Stalin's rule (and indeed beyond). Few women occupied top positions in the
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All-Union Council of Ministers (before 1946 called the Sovnarkom). the AllUnion Supreme Soviet, and the Communist Party Central Committee, and
not a single woman served on the Politburo, the highest policy-making body
of the CP between 1919 and Stalin's death. Women constituted between 12
and 21 percent of total Communist Party members in Stalin's time, although
they fared a bit better numerically in the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth
League (Komsomot constituting 34 percent of its members in the mid-1930s.
Female involvement in both the CP and the Komsomol was constrained by
anti-women prejudice as well as most women's daily double burden of having
to labor in the home and workplace.
Women's leadership in lower-level party and government bodies was also
limited, though it did increase during the Stalin era. Female leaders largelyserved in
political sectors directly related to women's everyday responsibilities as mothers,
wives, and caretakers, such as education and public health. Interestingly, some
female national minorities might have been better represented in government
and party institutions than their Slavic counterparts, for as the regime sought
to extend Soviet power in predominantly Muslim regions, it established quotas
mandating one-third of posts for women in such bodies.
In 1930, one of the main vehicles for women's political activism and advocacy,
the women's section of the Communist Party (Zhenotdet was abolished.
In the 1920s, the Zhenotde/ organized literacy campaigns, consciousnessraising activities among women, and a delegate system that offered women
political training and experience. It also sought to emancipate female national
minorities from "oppressive" religious and indigenous customs. Although
acting on behalf of the party, the Zhenotdel offered women some political
autonomy, and frequently advocated on behalf of "women's" issues. In 1930,
Communist leaders framed the liquidation of the women's section positivelyostensibly because the woman's question had been "solved" and women
had gained equality. In actuality, women lacked political parity or equality, and
the Zhenotde/'s dissolution eliminated a major vehicle for advancing women's
voices and concerns.
The regime's failure to treat women as political equals to men is
underscored in its structures of repression. To be sure, millions of women and
men suffered immensely during Stalin's purges in the mid-to-late 1930s, but
women constituted only about 6-9 percent of the prison-camp population of
the Gulag.The secret police targeted the wives and family members of political
prisoners, however, and established a special camp for them in Karaganda.
Female criminals and prostitutes also ended up in camps when police forces
targeted them as "socially harmful elements" during the mass operations
stage of the purges in 1937 and 1938. Even though Stalin and the Soviet
leadership did not deem women politically threatening enough to incarcerate
them en masse, the Great Terror inflicted deep violence on the psyches and
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lives of women who remained outside the camps, particularly those directly
connected to male "enemies of the people:· Guilty by association, these
women often lost their jobs and friends, and struggled to survive in conditions
of economic deprivation and social isolation,

Soviet Power, Islam, and Gender
Despite some changes in Soviet nationalities policy during the Stalin era,
the regime continued to link the Sovietization of national minorities to the
eradication of traditional religious and ethnic practices viewed as anti-Soviet
and oppressive to women. As a result, Communist authorities promoted
women's "emancipation" in the predominantly Muslim regions of Soviet
Azerbaijan and Central Asia, believing that this would win over local women,
undermine indigenous power and patriarchal family structures, and lead
to widespread social transformation, The Communist liberation narrative
about freeing Muslim women from male oppression contained problematic
Eurocentric and colonial assumptions, however.
Under Stalin, Party and local activists abandoned the Hujum, the very
public assault on religious and indigenous customs in Central Asia of 1926
and 1927,which had included mass unveiling campaigns in Uzbekistan and
Tadzhikistan, which had resulted in a violent backlash against women who
unveiled. Still, in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, unveiling and
ending female seclusion remained priorities, In regions where veiling was
not common among indigenous women, Soviet officials focused instead on
promoting women's education and medical care as well as enforcing recent
laws against bride-wealth, polygamy, and underage marriage, In the first
seven months of 1929, for example, Soviet courts tried over a thousand
Turkmeni men for engaging in these illegal marital practices. The police
and judiciary also went after local men who harmed women for unveiling
or engaging in public life. In addition to using criminal prosecutions to
advance change, the Stalinist government linked Communist Party loyalty to
compliance with new Soviet laws and initiatives, and punished or expelled
men for gender transgressions in the mass proverka (verification campaign)
of members that began in 1929, In the purges of the 1930s, Party men who
failed to unveil their wives or abandon other traditional gender and family
customs were often deemed "enemies of the people," Despite Soviet print
and visual culture in the 1930s that trumpeted the successful modernization
of female national minorities (such as newsreels featuring Russian and
Kazakhwomen doctors treating Kazakhmale patients), significant opposition
to gender reforms led many national minorities to ignore or subvert new
Soviet laws and prescriptions.
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Some Muslims, including Jadidists who advocated Islamic modernization
before the 1917 Revolution, and local women activists who supported changes
in gender norms and, in some cases, had initiated personal reforms in their own
lives in advance of Communist initiatives, supported the regime's liberation
policies for women. Other Muslims saw the campaign against Islamic and
ethnic practices as an imperialist assault on their way of life and an attempt
to impose Russian and foreign ways. From this perspective, the practice
of religious and indigenous customs became an act of political and cultural
resistance. Ironically, by politicizing everyday familial, marital, and gender
customs, the Soviet regime advanced Muslim women's political agency, a
Communist goal, which they didn't always exercise in support of Soviet power.
Whereas some Muslim women chose to eschew old practices and adopt
new "Soviet" behavior, others did not, either because of male pressure and
domination or in defense of their own religious and ethnic identities. Women's
actions, however, were not necessarily political or anti-colonial. Stalinist
policies of collectivization and modernization, as well as the Second World
War, wrought not only massive economic but also social changes, which
undermined traditional gender norms. As girls began to attend Soviet schools,
and women began to work as full-time collective farm laborers or urban
wage earners, female seclusion lessened. Because Soviet schools did not
allow students to wear veils, and veils were impractical in many workplaces,
veiling also became less common. Nonetheless, even as Muslim women
became better educated, adopted new jobs and public roles, discarded their
veils, exercised personal freedoms such as divorce that Communist power
· had introduced, and gained access to basic Soviet healthcare, many acted as
guardians of religious faith, indigenous customs, and ethnic identity in their
private lives, both during the Stalin era and in later years.

The Military and the Great Patriotic War
As toward 1939 the Stalinist regime readied for possible war with the capitalist
West, particularly Nazi Germany, it promoted another version of the New
Soviet Woman, the female soldier, who both disrupted and reaffirmed existing
gendered landscapes. Although some women had fought during the First
World War, the Russian Revolution, and the Civil War (1918-21), gender roles
in the early Soviet years marked men as the "defenders" of the country and
women as the "victims" of war and aggression in need of men's protection.
Stalinist authorities, however, encouraged female teenagers and young
women to enroll in an expanding network of paramilitary classes, and by
the mid-1930s, their participation was reportedly around 50 percent in many
regions. The Komsomol, and, to a lesser extent, the Society for the Promotion
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of Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Industries (Osoaviakhim), likewise
promoted girls' and women's military training. In the last few years before
the Nazi invasion, the Soviet press and popular culture also began to feature
the accomplishments of female snipers, parachutists, and sharpshooters,
suggesting that womanhood and military service were not incompatible.
The regime's celebration of three female aviators who set a new world flying
record in 1938 underscored women's technical and potential military prowess.
As approximately 800,000-1,000,000 women joined the Red Army and
partisan forces during the Second World War, women soldiers became
increasingly recognized as a distinct group in society. If, at first, female
volunteers signed up only as individuals, in early 1942, the Stalinist regime
shifted course and began to mobilize women officially because of the need for
new military recruits, given the decimation of fighting forces in 1941. Soviet
women served in many military capacities, in contrast to female service in the
armed forces elsewhere, in which women were cast as "noncombatants:·
In the Soviet context, the previously male space of combat was regendered
as a mixed space as hundreds of thousands of women served at the front.
Significantly, many women did not feel the need to erase their "female"
differences to become soldiers and asserted their womanliness instead of
cultivating a masculine soldierly self.
The gender transformation of the frontlines challenged the soldierly
identity of male troops. As a result, most male soldiers and commanders
initially viewed the identity of soldier and woman as antithetical, and reacted
to women soldiers in combat units with incomprehension and hostility. As the
war wore on, the experience of fighting alongside women, and sometimes
being commanded by them, appears to have changed some men's minds
about women's capacity to be military comrades. Many men, nonetheless,
sought to reaffirm their differences from women, and did so by asserting a
military masculinity that sexualizedfemale forces, and contributed to women's
sexual harassment and assault. Focusing on female soldiers' sexual rather
than military roles allowed men to disassociate combat from women and
construct them as sex partners rather than military comrades. Communist
leaders, meanwhile, celebrated men's hyperviolent masculinity and focused
on their outstanding individual feats of killing and courageous support for their
male comrades. Despite women's presence at the front, official discourse and
male soldiers touted the importance of this camaraderie to military successes,
linking frontline brotherhood to soldierly masculinity.
The Soviet press did not report the many difficulties female soldiers
faced, from sexual abuse to the lack of women's-size boots or of supplies
for menstruating women. Yet it also did not treat these women as an oddity.
Instead, the press extolled women soldiers' exploits as daughters fighting on
behalf of the Motherland. Many narratives also emphasized female soldiers'
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femininity, which may have reflected individual woman's self-presentation but
additionally served to reassure readers that a distinct binary gender order was
still intact. Significantly, reportage focused on exemplary women combatants
but not on female troops as a whole or the state's mobilization of women into
the armed forces, which effectively obscured the scale and nature of women's
involvement. As the silencing of this broader military context suggests, the
Stalinist regime did not intend for the female soldier to be a permanent identity.
Although many women were recognized during the war as heroes and
lauded for their military valor, in the immediate postwar and late-Stalin years
the central press and official war narratives largely marginalized female
combatants' contributions, focusing instead on women's war efforts as
workers and mothers. Soviet authorities rejected the female soldier as a
permanent model of womanhood by accelerating women's demobilization
at the end of the war and encouraging female troops to pursue nonmilitary
careers. The great Moscow Victory Parade reasserted the masculinity of
combat by notfeaturing women veterans. This suppression of female soldiers'
sacrifices was deeply painful for them; as one explained,
Men were victors, heroes, wooers, the war was theirs, but we were looked
at with quite different eyes ...
I'll tell you, they robbed us of the victory.'
In some postwar regional narratives, however, women veterans received
greater attention. In recently occupied Latvia, for example, they were honored
as symbols of the "liberation" of the new Soviet republic from past oppressors,
bourgeois, and Germans.
After the war, silence also surrounded the brutal sexual violence male Soviet
troops inflicted on perhaps 2 million German, Austrian, and other women as
they liberated Nazi-occupied regions and claimed victory over Germany. Even
if not official policy, soldiers perpetrated mass rape to express their Soviet and
masculine dominance over women, and the Third Reichand Axis enemies more
generally. By acting in groups, they reinforced their collective brotherhood and
transformed rape into a social act of male soldierly bonding, while pressuring
reluctant comrades to participate. Although this sexual violence might have
reinforced many soldiers' sense of virility, damaged from the war, it might also
have undermined their masculine identity by transgressing gender norms that
positioned men as male protectors of women and children. How did men's
sexual violence inform their postwar masculine selves and their reintegration
into civilian life? How did it affect their relationships with women? •
As the Stalinist regime applauded returning male soldiers, it encouraged
them to return to the workforce and "renew their military glory every day
in their work."' This transition proved difficult for many men who suffered
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emotional and physical damages from the war, especially the 2.75 million
physically disabled veterans who often lacked medical support, including
prosthetic devices, for their impairments. For many veterans, moreover,
the workplace was hardly a vehicle for heroic glory or even self-realization.
Alienated from work, politics, and their families, many veterans met in taverns,
bathhouses, and other homosocial venues where they reasserted their
frontline brotherhood. Meanwhile, many younger Soviet men who did not
serve during the Great Patriotic War and could not claim a military masculinity
sought to emulate soldiers, while others began to distinguish themselves by
developing an alternative and nonmilitary model of manhood rooted in jazz,
Western-style fashions, and dancing. Although these stylish young men
(sti/iag1)faced significant public disapproval,they were not repressed because
many were sons of the Stalinist elite and their "rebellion" was not explicitly
political. Joined by other young men and women from different social strata
in the late-Stalin and post-Stalin years, they contributed to a new Soviet youth
culture.
Enormous wartime losses, particularly of male lives, resulted in a
terrible population imbalance in the male-to-female ratio. Men constituted
approximately four-fifths of war deaths. Cognizant of this demographic crisis,
and a decline in the birth rate, the Stalinist government adopted a new Family
Law in 1944 to spur reproduction. By making divorce much more difficult and
redefining legal marriage to encompass only registered unions, the law was
supposed to promote family stability, and therefore greater procreation. The
law was hardly conservative, however. By stripping unregistered marriages
and any children of such unions of any legal standing, including paternal child
support, promising financial and other forms of government assistance to
• newly defined "unwed" mothers and "out-of-wedlock" children, and relieving
men of responsibility for offspring of sexual liasions, the law unintentionally
encouraged men to pursue extramarital affairs and impregnate unmarried
and widowed women.· Finally, by offering increased financial assistance
and new awards to mothers of large families, and lowering the number of
children required to receive such aid, the law was supposed to incentivize
motherhood.
The new law legitimized "single" motherhood, as did Soviet propaganda,
which heralded unmarried mothers' successes in raising happy and healthy
children. This does not mean, however, that unmarried mothers and their
children faced no social opprobrium. Meanwhile, the state's monetary aid
proved inadequate, and many "single"-mother families received less help
than they would have from child support payments. Moreover, religious and
cultural opposition to the new policy, for example, in )he new Lithuanian
Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as bureaucratic incompetence, meant that
some "single" mothers never received state aid.
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The war and the 1944 Family Law changed the structure of Sovie.tfamilies.
The huge number of widows, the greater difficulty in heterosexual pair
bonding given the unbalanced sex ratio, and the legitimization of unmarried
motherhood meant that "fatherless" families became an increasing reality. By
uncoupling marriage from reproduction, and adopting new pronatalist policies,
the Party-state made motherhood even more of an imperative for normative
womanhood. Meanwhile, Soviet public discourse, including literature, directed
women to be healers of men's physically and psychologically damaged bodies.
This had the effect of gendering wartime trauma male, erasing the very real
trauma that female soldiers and women on the home front had experienced.
During the war and in the postwar period, Stalinist propaganda and visual
culture asserted Soviet men's roles as fathers and protectors of their families.
Homecoming narratives continued this trend, emphasizing demobilized
soldiers' happy reunions with their families, and some postwar popular
magazines and paintings depicted returning fathers' bonds with their children.
These representations marked a shift from Soviet men's earlier marginalization
as fathers, and suggested a new familial masculinity for men to embrace.
At the same time, however, the 1944 Family Law-and the realities of the
war-undermined fathers' familial roles. Moreover, postwar visual culture
and media trumpeted Stalin's role as not only the paternal leader of the great
Soviet family but also the surrogate father in individual families.

SexualPolitics
The sexual politics of the Stalinist regime-like its gender politics-were
oriented toward transforming and regulating sexual norms, practices, and
identities to promote a new Soviet order and Party-state objectives. Soviet
discourses and policies regarding gender, the family, ethnic and national
minorities, religion, and class, as well as the regime's economic and political
agendas, informed Stalinist sexual politics.
During the early Soviet and Stalin years, Communist authorities promoted
heterosexuality as the natural and "normal" sexuality for Soviet citizens.
Although they promulgated this construction of heterosexuality in new family
laws, court cases, visual culture, and printed media, as already discussed,
they also rejected various forms of heterosexual relations and practices, such
as underage marriages, which were associated with women's oppression
and "backward" religious and national customs. Under Stalin, female
prostitution, which had been decriminalized in 1922, came under increased
attack. If during the early Soviet years public health and medical officials
sought to rehabilitate female prostitutes and integrate them into society, in
the early 1930s Communist authorities adopted more punitive tactics and
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increasingly sent them to corrective labor colonies in the Gulag system. This
change was a result of new police efforts to regulate urban areas and cleanse
them of "social anomalies," given the massive social dislocation caused by
Stalin's economic policies. In addition, in the context of the drive for rapid
industrialization and women's mass entry into paid labor, the alleged causes of
women's prostitution-unemployment and dismal material conditions-were
purportedly resolved. According to Communist authorities, women were no
longer compelled to sell their bodies, and, thus, if they did, deserved to be
punished.
The previously discussed Stalinist Family Law of 1936 affirmed the
regime's sexual conservatism, including its rejection of the more liberated
heterosexuality of the postrevolutionary years and 1920s, which was marked
by an increase in premarital and nonmarital sexual relations as well as
divorces. Indeed, as the new policy explained, making divorce more difficult
was intended to combat "light-minded attitudes toward the family and family
obligations:· 10 Nonetheless, although the new law indicated a shift, most
Communist leaders had in fact long promoted sexual conservatism. In the
early 1920s, they rejected Kollontai's radical sexual ideas and viewed sexual
liberation as distracting to the socialist cause. The Komsomol sought to
channel young people's sexual energy into the collective building of socialism.
Many Soviet officials, social commentators, and medical professionals decried
sexual libertinism, linking "excessive" sexual activity to moral degradation and
poor health. Sanitary enlightenment propaganda of the 1920s talked about
non-procreative and casual sex only in negative terms, associating it with
venereal disease, men's infidelity to their wives, and the sexually deviant
prostitute.
The regime's sexual conservatism, nonetheless, intensified under Stalin's
rule. Public discussions about sexuality disappeared in the 1930s. By 1932, the
nascent field of Soviet sexology was dead, and plans to host the Fifth Congress
of the World League of Sexual Reform in the Soviet Union were abandoned.
Studies of sexual behavior, venereal diseases, or related publications were
either destroyed or removed to special divisions in the libraries that were
closed to the general public. As Soviet authorities terminated the public health
sexual enlightenment efforts of the 1920s, citizens were schooled, instead, via
"moral education" and the punishment of "deviant" behavior. Freudian ideas
about sexuality and psychoanalysis were discredited as perverse. In 1934, the
government (re-) criminaiiz.edsodomy (meaning male homosexuality). and in
1935, it passed an anti-pornography law.
The Stalinist regime's criminalization of male homosexuality in 1933 and
1934 marked a significant policy change. In 1917,Bolshevik leaders repealed
tsarist criminal statutes, including the criminalization of male sodomy, and
the new Russian Criminal Code of 1922 reaffirmed this change. So, too,
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did the penal codes in Soviet Ukraine and Belorussia. The legalization of
consensual male same-sex relations, partly a product of the new regime's
decision to secularize criminal law, did not indicate widespread acceptance.
Instead of viewing homosexuality as a crime, Communist leaders, Soviet
officials, and experts adopted a biomedical perspective and characterized
it as an abnormality, illness, and psychological "perversion." Significantly,
homosexuality was decriminalized in the more "modern" and "European"
parts of the Soviet Union, but not in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Soviet
Central Asian republics. In these, more "primitive;' regions with a majority
of non-Slavic peoples, Communist authorities viewed homosexuality
differently, claiming that it was particularly common and "an endemic form of
depravity" that warranted punishment. 11 In Central Asia, they also outlawed
the "keeping of bachi;' that is, the practice of hiring cross-dressed feminine
dancing boys as entertainers and prostitutes for men, which they associated
with the persistence of local "primitive" and capitalist customs. Communist
authorities also rejected a biomedical approach to same-sex relations among
Russi~ljJ)Jrthodox clergy, or between clergy and laymen (particularly boys),
claiming, instead, that homosexuality and pederasty were the result of the
perverted conditions of a monastic and religious life. The regime's approach to
male same-sex relations in the early Soviet years, therefore, was multifaceted
and inconsistent. Even in regions where homosexuality was legalized, Soviet
censorship limited public discussion about same-sex sexuality or its artistic
and literary representation, while homophobia led many gay men in the 1920s
to get married to advance their careers, as Communist and medical authorities
deemed marriage a cure for same-sex desire.
A new domestic and international context in the late 1920s and early 1930s
contributed to the (re-) criminalization of male sodomy. During the First FiveYear Plan (1928-32), Communist Party leaders directed the Commissariat of
Health and related professionals to adopt new medical priorities and strategies
to boost industrial and agricultural workers' productivity. This coincided with
the imposition of new orthodoxies in a variety of scientific and cultural fields
and delegitimization of "bourgeois" and non-Party specialists (professionals
associated with the Old Regime) as part of the so-called Cultural Revolution.
Together, these changes contributed to attacks against "biologizing" doctors
and scientists who supported a biomedical understanding of homosexuality,
psychiatrists who promoted a biosocial and therapeutic approach to same-sex
desire, and sexologists who sought to better understand human sexuality. In
this environment, research about and "treatment" of Soviet homosexualsmale and female-appears to have ceased. Meanwhile, as the police stepped
up efforts to control urban areas and remove social problems, gay men were
targeted in visible male homosexual subcultures. After raids against gay and
bisexual men in Russian and Ukrainian urban communities in 1933, Genrikh
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lagoda (1891-1938), the deputy chief of the secret police, contacted Stalin
with a new draft anti-sodomy law, arguing that "pederasts" threatened state
security by engaging in espionage and debauching "healthy young people:'
In these new domestic circumstances, Soviet leaders rejected the earlier
medical and psychiatric approach to homosexuality in favor of a new penal
approach involving compulsory labor treatment.
The politicization of male homosexuality in the context of the growing Nazi
threat also played a role in recriminalization. Speaking in 1934 on behalf of
the anti-sodomy law, the world-famous writer Maxim Gorky (Gor'kii; 18681936) justified it as a blow against the forces of fascism by asserting that
homosexuality was a product of fascist degeneracy and foreign perversion.
Arguing that homosexuality had no place in the Soviet Union, he proclaimed
"Destroy the homosexuals-Fascism will disappear:·12 Other Communist
leaders also envisioned homosexuals as political enemies involved in antiSoviet activities. Official discourse that associated homosexuality with the
corruption of male youth and bourgeois depravity further delegitimized it.
Purportedly "normal;' politically loyal, non-fascist, and non-bourgeois Soviet
people did not engage in same-sex relations.
The number of male victims of the new anti-sodomy law is difficult to
determine, given the lack of access to relevant archives and the bureaucratic
complexity of surveillance and prosecution. Existing evidence, however,
suggests mass arrests occurring in several major Soviet cities in 1934 and
thousands of prosecutions (if not more) during the Stalin era. In this context,
Pyotr, the gay soldier mentioned earlier in this chapter, would have become a
target. Still, despite repression, male urban homosexual subcultures continued
to exist, as men rejected the heteronormative sexual order by meeting for
love and sex. Meanwhile, male same-sex relations that were more "private"
appear to have garnered less police attention, and some gay and bisexual men,
including well-known figures, lived their lives without persecution, especially if
they married women and kept their same-sex desires from the public. For gay
men living more openly, punishment was a real possibility during the purges
of the 1930s, including not only imprisonment but also execution. The poet
Nikolai Kliuev (1884-1937), for example, who wrote about homosexual love
and refused to compose "normal verses;' met this fate. While undoubtedly
the all-Union anti-sodomy law and official homophobia adversely affected the
lives of men-loving-men during the Stalin era, details of the lived experience
of such men are not well known, particularly in rural areas and regions with
national and religious minorities.
Significantly, female homosexuality was not criminalized under Stalin or
any other Soviet leader. Unlike their male counterparts, women-loving-women
were not characterized as a potential political threat since women generally
lacked political power. Authorities didn't view female same-sex sexuality as
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a social threat either; women's lesser economic power to establish urban
subcultures as well as their more private forms of social organization meant
their same-sex relations were not as publicly visible as that of queer men.
Soviet discourses that promoted motherhood as essential to womanhood
and as women's civic duty also compelled many queer women to enter into
heterosexual marriages so they could become mothers, which masked their
identities and desires. Meanwhile, medical professionals argued that" genuine"
female homosexuals were uncommon, and associated female homosexuality
with "masculine" women who demonstrated gender nonconformity in their
dress, behavior, and adoption of "male" jobs. Interestingly, although most
experts condemned these women for their sexual transgressions, some
viewed their gender transgressions more equivocally, for they associated
th~se women's masculinity with political consciousness, skills, and public
competency. Doctors and psychiatrists argued that "feminine" and genderconforming women who pursued same-sex relations did so because of
bad heterosexual relations, or because of temporary corruption by the
"mannish" female homosexual. Although female same-sex relations were not
criminalized, it appears that at least some lesbians faced punishment in the
early Soviet and Stalin eras for their sexually transgressive behavior, charged
with crimes such as engaging in "depraved acts" with a minor, "crimes of
nature;· and "hooliganism:' 13
Despite the Stalinist regime's condemnation and criminalization of male
homosexuality, policies regarding it were not consistent. In the Gulag, the
forced-labor penal camp system initiated under Stalin's rule was apparently
pervasive, and largely ignored (or tolerated) by camp officials who viewed it
as a product of incarceration and a homosocial environment. They also viewed
it as a product of carceral power relations, in which prisoners established
a hierarchy, enacting sexual violence against other inmates and reducing
"passive" homosexuals to the lowest status. Authorities permitted this system
of sexual dominance, which they could and did manipulate, particularly since
it often involved "criminal" inmates (supposedly friendly to the Soviet regime)
abusing "political" inmates (those deemed hostile to Communist rule). Many
camp officials also indulged queer relations because of the perception that
they helped to preserve order and enhance labor output. If some men engaged
in homosexual sex to experience pleasure and enact violence against others,
others pursued consenting queer relationships for intimacy and love. Some
men also engaged in sexual barter to receive benefits, such as additional food.
Female same-sex sexuality in the camps also appears to have been
largely ignored or tolerated by officials. Like male same-sex sexuality, many
interpreted it as acquired and temporary homosexuality due to incarceration;
ostensibly when released, the majority of women would abandon same-sex
relations in favor of heterosexual ones. Although female prisoners of all social
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classes engaged in same-sex relations-for the sake of pleasure, love, or in
exchangefor improved living and work conditions-women of the intelligentsia
often sought to conceal their lesbian affairs in an effort to maintain their class
distinction. According to them, it was "criminal" inmates who engaged in
such relations, allegedly seducing innocent prisoners and shamelessly
parading their desires. Educated women also constructed "criminal" queer
women as different, even disgusting, because many violated gender norms.
In the lesbian subculture of the camps, some women assumed a "masculine"
and assertive role (the kobly, butches), while others assumed a "feminine"
and "passive" role (the kovyrialki, femmes). Although such "butch-femme"
couples existed in the 1920s and earlier, and were not merely a product of
the Gulag, some scholars allege that camp life helped to mainstream this
relationship model and subculture, eclipsing most other models and an earlier
"salon" lesbian subculture. This argument is moot: It underscores the need
for more research to better understand the nuances and complexity of female
queer relations under Stalin's rule and in subsequent years.
Whereas Communist Party meetings and procurators' reports from
camps appear to have evinced no concern about homosexual relations, the
same cannot be said of heterosexual sex. Communist authorities and camp
administrators frequently discussed it as a problem and sought to limit sexual
contact between male and female prisoners by officially banning cohabitation,
punishing inmates for heterosexual relations, and imposing sex-segregation in
the camps. This might have been because of the potential economic problems
resulting from heterosexual sex: any pregnancies and births hindered women's
labor productivity and required the allocation of scarce camp resources to
support pregnant and nursing mothers as well as babies and children. In the
broader context of the regime's pronatalism, however, this procreation was
still useful to the state, and many camps established maternity wards and
nurseries. Despite the efforts to curb heterosexual sex, it flourished in the
camps. Although some female prisoners sought heterosexual intimacy, many
others experienced sexual violence at the hands of male inmates and camp
personnel: Some heterosexual female prisoners, like their queer counterparts,
also used sexual barter to better their camp situations.
Under Stalin, Communist leaders adopted a relatively "radical" position
on interethnic and interracial sexual relations. Unlike many governments
around the world, which banned "miscegenation" and interracial unions, the
Stalinist regime endorsed racial mixing and mixed marriages. Although in the
early Soviet years some scholars and eugenicists objected to these unions
because of their belief in a worldwide racial hierarchy and the idea that the
mixing of the "races" would lead to physical and moral degeneracy, Stalinist
authorities officially repressed these views in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Soviet laws already embraced the equality of all people, regardless of race
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or ethnicity. Moreover, according to Communist ideology, differences among
people were a result of historical, cultural, and material differences rather
than biological differences. As Nazi rule was established in 1933, the Stalinist
regime explicitly rejected Nazi and eugenicist racist ideas. Rather than seeing
mixed marriages as a negative, the Communist Party characterized mixed
marriages as a positive means for bringing the Soviet Union's diverse groups
together and generating a unified people. Mixed marriages also legitimized
communism by exemplifying the Soviet commitment to racial equality and
the "friendship of peoples;' in contrast to the explicit racism of capitalist and
fascist regimes.

Wartime and Postwar Sexualities
The mass upheaval of the Second World War contributed to the development
of a new Soviet sexual landscape. As men and then women entered the
armed forces, and families fell under German occupation, or were evacuated
away from the front, many relationships collapsed. Wartime conditions led
many husbands, wives, and non-married lovers to seek sexual and emotional
intimacy outside of their existing unions. In the process, sexual norms
and practices in Soviet society shifted, and extramarital as well as casual
relationships became more common.
This kind of sexual behavior flourished in the Red Army. While some rankand-file female and male soldiers fell in love with each other and established
mutually affectionate unions, other military relationships were more hierarchical
and tended to involve male officers with female subordinates. Women in these
relationships-frequently called "field campaign wives"-provided
sexual
and other services to higher-ranking men in exchange for special privileges,
such as supplementary rations. While some women actively pursued these
relationships, others were essentially commanded to play this role by their
superiors. Still other women felt compelled to enter into these relationships
because of the constant male sexual harassment they faced. As one female
soldier explained,
It was very hard for us to exist in that zone. For that reason, many of
the girls got off with one single guy, in order to protect themselves from
advances from the rest of them .... It was very hard.14
Women soldiers were also raped by their male compatriots.
Although both men and women were sexually active in the Red Army,
women were subjected to a sexual double standard. Many male soldiers
apparently saw women's sexual activity either as a sign of weakness-a way
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to gain benefits or to get pregnant so they would be sent home-or a sign
of immorality, whereas they saw their own similar sexual conduct as natural.
Soviet society more broadly condemned women's sexual relations in the
Red Army, holding them but not men accountable for what many perceived
as a wartime breakdown in moral values. This double standard had serious
consequences for military women at the end of the war, and effectively
silenced the sexual violence that some had experienced. The perception
that many female soldiers had been "loose" also stigmatized them and led
many women to keep their bravery and military contributions at the front to
themselves. "Try telling it;' one woman veteran stated, "and who will give you
a job then, who will marry you?" 15
It is likely that the wartime conditions that led to a new morality and more
temporary heterosexual relations on the home front also contributed to an
increase in same-sex relations. As research about other countries has shown,
the Second World War provided many opportunities for male troops to act on
same-sex desires, which they may have been unable or unwilling to explore
during peacetime. Moreover, despite Soviet women's military participation,
the armed forces as a whole remained very male, and most men experienced
the war in a homosocial context. Unlike elsewhere, Soviet authorities did not
grant male troops regular leave or organize wartime brothels so that men could
pursue heterosexual liaisons. As male troops experienced the challenges of
war, they frequently took care of each other, performing "feminine" tasks
such as tending to wounds and preparing food. Many men formed deep
friendships and emotional bonds, and some even spoke of their great love for
each other, which in some cases was presumably romantic love. As women
soldiers also experienced the hardships of the war, and new opportunities
for pursuing same-sex intimacy, undoubtedly some turned to each other for
love and support, including sex. It is worth noting that although many of the
same-sex relations during the war were consensual, inevitably some were
also nonconsensual.
Freer sexual relations during the war were reinforced by the 1944 Family
Law, which implicitly encouraged non-conjugal relationships and greater sexual
promiscuity for reproductive purposes. This law too reaffirmed a sexual double
standard; women were expected to be sexually active to become mothers,
but not to pursue sexual activity for the sake of pleasure. Indeed, the Soviet
regime regarded female sexuality with great ambivalence, particularly female
youth sexuality. Anxiety among Communist and educational authorities in the
late 1930s and early war years about "unhealthy relations" between boys and
girls, and a perceived increase in youth sexual activity, fueled the Stalinist
regime's decision in 1943 to abandon coeducation in urban schools. This
policy to monitor and contain youth sexuality remained in place throughout
Stalin's reign.
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Although Stalin hardly promoted a politics of sexual freedom, there was a
kind of sexual revolution after his first decade in power. The Great Patriotic War
and the new Family Law of 1944 had a dramatic effect on sexual norms and
behaviors. The Gulagalso appears to have fostered new sexual practices, and
its revolving door-a yearly release of perhaps 20 percent of inmates during
the Stalin era as well as an amnesty in 1945-meant that Soviet society was
flooded with released prisoners, some of whom likely pursued similar sexual
conduct at home. Finally, the demographic imbalance at the end of the war
contributed to a crisis of heterosexuality in the postwar period, as reproductiveaged women vastly outnumbered their male counterparts. For millions of
Soviet women, marriage was simply unattainable, and since motherhood was
tied to normative womanhood, millions of widows and single women became
unmarried mothers in the late 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, from 1945 to 1955,
8.7 million children were officially born out of wedlock. As "looser" sexual
relationships between men and women prevailed in the postwar and late Stalin
era, the divorce rate also continued to climb, despite the greater difficulty in
procuring one." Sexual norms and practices, of course, varied in different Soviet
communities, so overall trends do not do justice to regional and local variations.
If the regime effectively sanctioned new heterosexual norms and behaviors,
it did not approve of new expressions of same-sex desires or liaisons. Authorities'
condemnation of "pair friendships" among cadets at the Suvorov military
academies in the late 1940s, which they deemed "the worst, most unhealthy
form of individualism;· suggests official anxiety about postwar military samesex relationships. 17 Concern by Gulag doctors and administrators about the
spread of homosexual identities and queer sex in Soviet society as millions
of prisoners were released after Stalin's death suggests that they might have
had similar fears upon the release of at least 600,000 inmates in Stalin's 1945
amnesty. Notwithstanding official homophobia during the Stalin era, however,
there doesn't appear to be evidence of an active homophobic campaign and
punitive policies against the Gulag queer until after Stalin's death. Moreover,
despite criminal prosecutions of men having sex with men in the postwar
period, evidence from court cases suggests that many Soviet citizens knew
about but did not report them to authorities. This "quiet accomodationism"
may have existed as well in the earlier Stalin era, but it is also possible that this
limited tolerance was a result of new "popular notions of domestic privacy and
accepted official intrusion" after the Second World War.18

Conclusion
When Stalin died in 1953, the Stalinist gender and sexual order was not
replaced by a more liberal one, despite destalinization and various liberalizing
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reforms under Nikita Khrushchev's leadership. Instead, the new regime
increased the persecution and prosecution of male same-sex desire-both in
the Gulag and in wider society. As lesbians, too, received renewed attention,
medical professionals often subjected them to psychiatric "treatment"
and hospitalization for their "perversions:· Seeking to replace Stalin's overt
coercion and repression as a method of control, Khrushchev instead promoted
moral renewal as official policy as a way to discipline citizens. The campaign
to promote "communist morality;' combined with Khrushchev's efforts to
reinvigorate socialist democracy (popular participation in the administration
of society). resulted in the more overt regulation of gender and sexual norms
and practices in the everyday lives of Soviet people, as new and revived
mechanisms for peer surveillance were established.
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